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INTRODUCTION 
The EU economy continues to struggle with the post-financial crisis correction. Financial 
tensions have continued in the euro area before the summer, while the global economy has 
decelerated reducing the potential contribution of exports to recovery. Therefore, the short-
term outlook for the EU economy remains weak, but a gradual return to growth is projected 
for 2013 and a further strengthening in 2014. This outlook creates additional challenges for 
the necessary adjustment in many EU Member States. In particular, low growth prospects 
hold back investment, job creation and accelerate labour shedding, as the margins to use 
flexibility in work patterns are now reduced. 
The challenges facing the EU economy continue to be daunting. In particular, several 
Member States' economies continue to face large deleveraging of the private and public 
sectors. This deleveraging reflects the unwinding of accumulated financial imbalances linked 
to previous unsustainable expenditure levels financed by credit, in some cases promoted by 
asset price bubbles in the private sector and in others by the lack of fiscal rigour in the public 
sector. This is now weighing on growth, as spending is reduced and income directed to debt 
repayment. 
On the positive side, there are signs that the adjustment in the EU economies is 
progressing. Financial market situation has improved after the summer on the back of the 
steady implementation of the reform agenda, including the advancements in the EMU 
architecture, and by the important policy decisions in the euro area, including by the ECB. 
The significant reform efforts in the vulnerable Member States are also bearing fruit: 
leveraging has decreased in the private and public sectors and competitiveness is improving in 
countries with large competitiveness gaps creating conditions for further adjustment going 
forward. Exports are contributing increasingly to improvements in large current account 
deficits, which bodes well for the lasting nature of the correction. The large growth 
differences among the EU countries are also a reflection of the ongoing adjustment: 
temporarily lower or negative growth is often a feature of deep adjustments, but they open the 
way for more sustainable growth and convergence, which should be visible already in 2014. 
The deleveraging and adjustment process is inevitable and the main task of policy makers is 
to manage it and alleviate the associated economic and social consequences. 
Fiscal adjustment has to continue along the path of a differentiated growth-friendly 
consolidation strategy in view of the high debt levels and long-term challenges to public 
finances. However, as fiscal consolidation can have negative growth effects in the short term, 
it should be conducted in a growth-friendly manner, that is: 
–  the speed of consolidation has to be differentiated across countries according to 
their fiscal space, to strike the right balance between potential negative growth 
effects and the risks to debt sustainability. The Stability and Growth Pact and 
the central role of structural budget balances therein offer the appropriate 
framework to guide the differentiated speed of adjustment; 
–  while focusing the consolidation on the expenditure side, there is a need to 
devise an overall growth-friendly mix of revenue and expenditure, with 
targeted measures within available fiscal space to protect key growth drivers 
while ensuring efficiency of expenditure. 
Additionally, credibility of consolidation and its positive effects are enhanced if it is anchored 
in a credible medium-term fiscal framework and accompanied by reforms addressing the 
long-term sustainability issues stemming from an ageing population.  
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Orderly deleveraging in the private sector requires a robust and efficient financial 
sector. Therefore, financial repair and restructuring has to continue in particular in the 
banking sector in view of its important role in the EU economy, but also new sources of 
funding have to be promoted. A coherent and effective micro- and macro-prudential policy 
framework is crucial to restore confidence in the stability of the banking sector, foster a 
sustainable flow of capital into productive activities and to ensure stable financing of the 
economy. 
Structural reforms are necessary to facilitate adjustment and improve the framework 
conditions for growth. Structural reforms, which improve competitiveness, wage 
responsiveness and price flexibility are key to improving adjustment capabilities and to 
stimulating the transfer of resources from declining to growing sectors. Reforms promoting 
job creation, investment in innovation, skills and inclusive growth are necessary to tackle the 
risk of hysteresis and alleviate the negative impact of the crisis on social conditions. A fair 
distribution of the adjustment burden across society is important for sustained growth. 
Ultimately, however, a coherent policy mix encompassing both macro-financial and structural 
policies is indispensable for growth to resume. Hence a determined policy action on all these 
fronts is necessary to counter the negative dynamics and improve the economic situation in a 
sustainable manner. 
The countries of the euro area are in a specific situation due to their stronger financial and 
economic interlinkages and the resulting spillovers. 
Private capital flows within the euro area have turned around abruptly, flowing away 
from vulnerable countries. The external financing gap that emerged as a result was bridged 
through the provision of liquidity by the official sector, which prevented a disorderly 
adjustment. However, as a result of an increasing home bias, financing conditions for both the 
public and private sectors have been diverging increasingly within the euro area. This has led 
to a very tight policy mix in the vulnerable euro-area Member States, as tight financing 
conditions add to the necessary fiscal consolidation. This is hampering adjustment, 
contributing further to divergent economic outcomes between euro-area countries and 
undermining the stability of the whole currency area. 
The main priority for the euro area is to continue on the path of structural reform and 
to reverse financial fragmentation, improve financing conditions in the vulnerable 
countries and to encourage the inflow and efficient allocation of capital to support 
adjustment. This is indispensable for growth and adjustment. Also, the need to reduce 
macroeconomic imbalances highlights the need for a differentiated pace of public 
deleveraging between the surplus and the deficit countries. Finally, in view of the single 
monetary policy, structural reforms to increase wage and price flexibility and facilitate 
adjustment play an even greater role in the euro area. 
Continuous perseverance in reforms is of the utmost importance to meeting the 
challenges. The European Stability Mechanism has become operational on 8 October 2012 
and the ECB has decided to introduce the Outright Monetary Transactions in September 2012. 
These are important contributions to tackling the most immediate challenge of stabilising the 
financial situation and restoring confidence. Restructuring and rebalancing of the economies 
will be materialising over the medium term, as the structural reforms usually take time to have 
full effect. Finally, the vision of genuine EMU is being developed as a long-term goal, for 
which tangible steps are already being taken to support reform momentum. As a result, 
financial market tensions have eased somewhat recently, but markets remain fragile and have 
become dependent on the continuation of supportive policies. Therefore, any stalling in 
reform efforts could immediately lead to a re-emergence of tensions and undo the recent 
improvements.  
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1.  GROWTH-FRIENDLY FISCAL CONSOLIDATION 
Sound and sustainable public finances are an essential prerequisite for macroeconomic 
stability and hence for growth. This is particularly the case in the euro area, where the 
single monetary policy cannot react to country-specific circumstances, and national budgets 
need to regain their ability to assume a stabilisation function in the event of country-specific 
shocks. At the same time, euro-area Member States share much stronger spillovers from 
unsustainable fiscal policies, chiefly through the financial channel, as clearly demonstrated by 
the current crisis. This calls for greater responsibility in terms of budgetary developments at 
national level. This is at the root of the rules-based fiscal governance provided for in the 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The respect of these rules is essential for a 
smooth functioning of EMU. 
Fiscal consolidation has negative effects on growth in the short term as fiscal 
retrenchment reduces aggregate spending, but benefits accrue in the medium-term. 
During financial crises, the impact of fiscal policy on growth can be larger than usual, as the 
so-called fiscal multipliers are thought to be larger than in normal economic conditions
1. In 
the short-term, this could also entail adverse effects on debt-to-GDP ratios from consolidation 
if initial debt ratios, and hence consolidation needs, are high. 
Nevertheless, in some Member States there is no viable alternative to consolidation, as 
its absence could lead to even more negative consequences. In the presence of high and 
rising debt levels, it is necessary to look at debt sustainability, which is a medium-term 
concept. The Commission’s analysis
2 shows that only under rather implausible assumptions 
(very high degree of myopia in the markets, very unusual reactions of risk premia) would 
consolidation lead to adverse debt effects in the medium term. Moreover, creating conditions 
for, and expectations of, a permanent consolidation is an important part of avoiding adverse 
debt effects, as expectations of a reversal in consolidation can cancel out its potential positive 
effects on risk premia. At the same time, for Member States with reduced market access, the 
assessment of the costs of consolidation, also in the short term, depends on the alternative 
scenario considered. When fiscal sustainability is at risk, the lack of consolidation can result 
in higher risk premia or the loss of any market access, which could prompt a much more 
dramatic adjustment, with consequences for growth that are far worse than in the case of 
consolidation and improved fiscal sustainability. 
While some EU countries enjoy more room for manoeuvre, the risks stemming from 
slowing fiscal consolidation should be carefully assessed. Some EU Member States 
currently enjoy record-low interest rates on their public debt and hence could seemingly 
increase their borrowing without running into risks of unsustainable dynamics. However, also 
in those countries debt is at peacetime highs. Moreover, in almost all of them, public 
expenditure is projected to increase due to ageing, and in some cases, low growth prospects. 
Therefore, it cannot be excluded that a loosening of the commitment to sustainable fiscal 
policies would lead to a switch in market sentiment. This would have serious repercussions 
not only for the countries concerned but also for the crisis-management capacity of the euro 
area as a whole, which relies on the creditworthiness of these countries. 
                                                 
1    Although, there is no evidence supporting some recent propositions about very large size of the 
multipliers, see e.g. Box I.5 "Forecast errors and multiplier uncertainty" in European Economic 
Forecast, Autumn 2012, European Economy 7/2012 
2  See European Commission (2012) Report on Public finances in EMU 2012, European Economy 4/2012 
DG Economic and Financial Affairs.  
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Graph 1. Government debt and deficit in EU Member States (forecast for 2012, % of 
GDP) 
 
Source: Commission Services, European Economic Forecast, Autumn 2012 
EU public finances face great challenges, and fiscal stability must be restored in a 
permanent manner (Graph 1). The challenges stem from the need to reduce high debt levels 
in an environment of low growth prospects, long-term spending pressures and an already 
relatively high tax burden. Thus, the overarching principle of growth-friendly fiscal 
consolidation remains valid. The strategy advocated by the Commission in the previous 
Annual Growth Survey, has proved successful, even if short-term negative consequences 
could not be avoided, as argued above, and the full benefits can become visible only in the 
medium term. 
The effect of consolidation on growth can be influenced by its composition. Additionally, to 
guarantee the permanent nature of consolidation and improve expectations of fiscal 
sustainability, consolidation should be accompanied by reforms strengthening the long-term 
sustainability of public finances and supported by a robust institutional framework. 
The pace of consolidation 
The pace of consolidation should continue to be differentiated across countries 
according to fiscal space. In particular, in view of the persistent market pressure on the high-
debt countries, countries which have lost access to financial markets or are under severe 
market pressure must continue to implement the agreed fiscal commitments. Other Member 
States should continue to respect their commitments under the SGP, which allows automatic 
stabilisers to work around the agreed path of structural fiscal adjustment while ensuring the 
long-term sustainability of public finances. 
The Stability and Growth Pact offers a flexible and efficient framework to guide the 
differentiated pace of consolidation. The rules of the SGP allow for the pace of 
consolidation to vary according to the particular characteristics of the Member States. Within 
the SGP countries are assigned nominal targets, for the benefit of transparency and anchoring 
budgetary policies. However, the Council recommendations also specify the necessary 
structural effort, which should capture the underlying budgetary positions without taking into 
account cyclical effects and one-off measures. If a country had delivered the agreed structural  
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effort, but fails to achieve its targets only as a result of worse-than-expected growth, the 
deadline for correction of the excessive deficit can be extended. This option has been taken up 
on several occasions in the past, most recently for Spain and Portugal. 
The composition of consolidation 
While expenditure-led consolidations should be favoured, the focus should be on an 
overall efficient and growth-friendly mix of expenditure and revenue measures. Analysis 
of past episodes of consolidation suggests that expenditure-based consolidations are more 
likely to succeed. Also, given the relatively high tax burden in the EU, further tax increases 
could impact negatively on future growth and should therefore be introduced with caution. 
Overall, in order to limit the short-term negative effects on growth, the composition of 
consolidations should find the right mix of growth-friendly measures on the expenditure side 
and the revenue side. 
The efficiency of spending and the quality of public finance in general is becoming 
increasingly important in view of the long-term challenges to public finance. In the light 
of historically high debt levels and the long-term impact of ageing populations, pressure on 
public expenditure is likely to remain beyond the current fiscal adjustment. Therefore 
reviewing expenditure efficiency becomes increasingly important in reconciling the need for 
sustainable public finances and the provision of public services at a satisfactory level. 
International best practices show that in many EU countries there is significant room for 
savings of public resources for unchanged levels of services. 
The pursuit of government sector reforms and the introduction of best practices in 
performance-oriented budgeting could be instrumental in increasing the efficiency of 
public spending. There is significant cross-fertilisation between public administration 
reforms spurred by spending reviews and performance-based budgeting, in terms of 
objectives and timeframes. While performance-oriented budgeting favours a holistic approach 
and requires long-term vision for both introduction and delivery of results, public 
administration reforms can generate fast and significant results in terms of efficiency of public 
spending and savings, provided that they are prepared by rigorous spending reviews and 
included in longer-term strategies. Public administration reforms could usefully focus on 
extracting savings where indicators, including cross-country and within-country comparisons, 
suggest the largest scope for saving (see also Section 3). Other measures relevant for spending 
efficiency may reflect the variety of socio-economic goals of different spending items, 
including distributional concerns, such as improved design and targeting of social transfers 
and state aid or other subsidies, identification of most productive public investment projects 
or improved efficiency in the provision of public goods and services. However, whatever the 
instrument chosen to strengthen public spending efficiency, it has to be accompanied by 
performance management at all levels of public administration. 
Expenditure savings should avoid items, which have a positive impact on growth and 
growth potential. Where cuts are envisaged, they should be minimised in areas related to the 
development of human capital and technological advances. For public investments in fixed 
assets the situation is less clear-cut. Such investment contributes to potential growth only as 
far as the new infrastructures are inputs to private investment, which applies mainly to 
investment in transport, communication and certain public utilities. Secondly, public 
investment in fixed assets is beneficial only up to a certain level, and for Member States with 
an already satisfactory level of infrastructure, the focus should rather be on maintenance and 
possibly upgrading.  
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On the revenue side of the budgets, despite recent reforms, many Member States still 
face substantial tax policy challenges. Some EU Member States could benefit, albeit to 
varying degrees, from revenue-side measures to consolidate their public finances and ensure 
sustainability. Such measures must, however, aim at improving the efficiency of tax systems 
while ensuring a fair distribution of the consolidation burden across all parts of society. 
Additional revenue would preferably be raised by broadening tax bases rather than increasing 
rates or creating new taxes. This may involve a need actively to review tax expenditure and 
other loopholes in personal and corporate income taxation, while cutting the scope for VAT 
reduced rates or exemptions or raising reduced rates to a level closer to the standard rate. 
Excise duty exemptions could also be reviewed with a view both to raising revenue and 
contributing effectively to other public policies (e.g. health and environment policy). 
Improved tax governance could also usefully complement revenue-raising measures. 
Some measures to address tax evasion, such as lifting the banking secrecy, seems to have 
brought significant additional tax revenue already in the short term. However, the gain in 
revenue from better tax governance is often difficult to estimate ex-ante and should therefore 
not be overestimated in the context of prudent fiscal policy, especially in the short term. 
Enhancing tax compliance could take various forms, such as reducing the shadow economy, 
combating potential VAT fraud and evasion, or promoting the efficiency of the tax 
administration. Improving the tax administration is a challenge many Member States face to 
raise additional revenue, reduce the high cost per net revenue collected and lighten the heavy 
administrative burden for small and medium-size companies. 
With respect to increasing the growth and jobs potential of European economies, 
revenue-neutral reforms could be considered. This is the case especially for Member States 
that have both the margin and the need for a shift from labour taxes to less distortionary taxes 
(consumption taxes, recurrent property taxes, environmental taxes). A tax composition with a 
high share of direct taxes and social security contributions alongside a low share of indirect 
taxes might indicate scope for such a tax shift. Revenue-neutral reform could also involve 
reducing high corporate income tax rates. 
The designing of the consolidation and tax reforms strategy should take account of other 
issues relating to the design of specific taxes. First, corporate taxation is often biased toward 
debt financing instead of equity funding. Secondly, housing taxation is based too much on 
transaction taxes rather than less harmful recurrent taxes on immovable property, while tax- 
deductibility of mortgage interest generates a debt bias and a risk of overinvestment in 
housing. Finally, environmental taxes could play an important role in meeting agreed 
environmental objectives and should over time provide appropriate incentives to reduce 
harmful emissions, in particular of greenhouse gasses. Tax reforms will have to reflect both 
economic efficiency and social equity, according to collective preferences. Distributional 
effects will have to be taken into account when designing tax reforms. 
Addressing long-term sustainability 
The need for consolidation is heightened by the challenges posed to public finances by an 
ageing population. The Fiscal Sustainability Report 2012
3 shows debt in the EU remaining 
stable until 2020, thanks to recent fiscal consolidation efforts and reform progress that nearly 
stabilize age-related spending. However, from 2021 onwards, the ageing costs take hold more 
firmly and debt in the EU starts to rise again, coming close to 90% of GDP by 2030. This 
dynamic can be reversed only through sustained efforts by Member States. If the 
improvement of the structural balance by 0.5% of GDP per year until the medium-term 
                                                 
3  See European Commission (2012) "Fiscal Sustainability Report 2012", European Economy 8/2012.  
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objective were to be achieved and maintained over the long-term, in line with the SGP,  the 
debt level would be brought close to 60% of GDP by 2030. 
While some countries are already addressing age-related pressure on spending, more 
remains to be done, in addition to delivering on current plans. Substantial efforts to 
reform pension systems have already been made in many Member States in the last decade, 
with visible positive budgetary impact. In the long run, however, a further increase in public 
pension expenditures in the long run is still to be expected at aggregate EU level
4 (+1.5 p.p. of 
GDP by 2060). This calls for enhanced efforts to reform pension systems, especially in 
countries where increases in pension expenditure are projected to be far above the EU average 
and where the reform process has not yet started in earnest. In 2012, a majority of Member 
States were given recommendations to adapt pension policy in 2012. While good progress has 
been made in a number of countries, including through restricting access to early retirement 
and harmonising the retirement age between men and women, in other Member States the 
reform agenda needs to be either intensified or activated. 
Linking the retirement age to life expectancy would help stabilise the balance between 
working years and years in retirement. To avoid recurrent difficult negotiations, the link 
should preferably follow automatic rules. This measure is an effective way of reducing 
longevity risk, addressing sustainability and adequacy concerns at the same time, by giving 
incentives to work longer and thus to accrue higher pension entitlements. To contribute 
successfully to higher effective retirement ages, reforms in pension systems need to be 
underpinned by policies that develop employment opportunities for older workers and support 
active and healthy ageing, complemented by tax and benefit policies giving incentives to stay 
longer at work and giving access to life-long learning. 
Member States have shown determination 
in pursuing fiscal consolidation and have 
reduced deficits significantly. According to 
the 2012 Commission Autumn Forecast, 
average general government deficit in the 
EU is expected to decline by 0.8 p.p. in 2012 
and reach 3.6% of GDP. For the euro area, 
the picture is broadly similar with the deficit 
falling to 3.3% of GDP. With continuing 
fiscal consolidation in 2013, general 
government deficit in the euro area is 
expected to fall below 3% of GDP for the 
first time since 2008 (Graph 2). In a majority 
of Member States, the composition of 
consolidation can be assessed as overall 
growth friendly and broadly balanced 
between revenue and expenditure. Between 
2007 and 2012 the main expenditure savings 
have been recorded in investment spending, intermediate consumption and the public wage 
bill. At the same time the share of social transfers has generally increased, particularly so in 
countries more strongly hit by the economic crisis. 
                                                 
4  See European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2012) "2012 Ageing Report: Economic 
and budgetary projections for the 27 EU Member States (2010-2060)", European Commission, 
European Economy, No 2. 
Graph 2. Budgetary developments – euro 
area 
 
Source: Commission Services  
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Fiscal consolidation appears to have been even stronger in structural than in nominal 
terms. The structural adjustments for 2012 are forecast to exceed 1 p.p. both in the EU and in 
the euro area. To reach such an outcome, Member States have on average stuck to their 
nominal targets, undertaking corrective measures in the course of the year in the context of a 
deteriorating macroeconomic background. The consolidation path is expected to remain 
steady in 2013, since Member States either have to implement the fiscal effort required under 
their Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) or have still to converge towards their medium-term 
objectives. This is expected to bring structural deficit down by more than 0.5 p.p. in the EU in 
2013. 
Fiscal governance and budgetary institutions 
Solid national budgetary frameworks are central for sound fiscal decision-making. 
Under the Treaties, final budgetary decisions remain with national authorities. It is thus key 
that Member States take action at national level to enhance predictability and the credibility of 
their commitments to prudent fiscal policy. The Directive on national budgetary frameworks 
and the Treaty on Stability, Convergence and Governance (TSCG) improve national fiscal 
frameworks considerably. Proper transposition of the Directive by the end of 2013 should 
ensure robust budgetary frameworks across EU Member States, including timely and 
comprehensive statistics, medium-term planning, reliance on realistic forecasts and definition 
of national fiscal rules promoting compliance with budgetary obligations under the Treaty. In 
addition, through the TSCG, 25 Member States have committed themselves to enshrining in 
binding national law the objective of a budget in balanced or in surplus, thus anchoring a 
founding principle of the SGP at the heart of national frameworks. Compliance should be 
further enhanced by national automatic correction mechanisms, to be designed in line with 
common principles and activated in well-defined circumstances, should enhance compliance. 
Fiscal governance at European level has been strengthened and the Commission has 
submitted more improvements to the co-legislators. The Six-Pack
5 has reinforced the 
preventive arm of EU fiscal surveillance and the ability to spot and correct fiscal imbalances 
at an early stage. It has introduced new tools such as an expenditure benchmark and a 
numerical debt rule. As the fiscal policies of the Member States sharing the same currency 
share increased budgetary spillovers, the financial sanctions for non-compliant euro-area 
Member States have been strengthened, but are now also applied more gradually and at an 
earlier stage. The Commission has proposed further improvements in fiscal surveillance for 
euro-area Member States in the two Regulations that form the Two-Pack. The Regulation on 
enhanced surveillance streamlines and reinforces the fiscal surveillance applicable to Member 
States threatened with or experiencing financial difficulties, while the Regulation on enhanced 
monitoring of budgetary policies creates a closer monitoring of Member States in EDP to 
ensure a timely correction of excessive deficits. It also reinforces preventive action at EU 
level by laying cornerstones for genuine budgetary policy coordination in the EMU, e.g. a 
common budgetary timeline, a coordinated submission of annual national budgetary plans to 
the Commission ahead of their parliamentary adoption. 
                                                 
5   A legislative package of five regulations and a directive, which entered into force on 13th December 
2011. The legislation reinforced the Stability and Growth Pact and introduced a new set of rules for the 
surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances. See also: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/governance/2012-03-14_six_pack_en.htm   
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2.  RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY 
Over the past year, financial tensions in the EU financial markets have continued, but 
there are signs of an improvement recently. The negative feedback loops between euro-
area sovereigns, banks and growth continued to fuel financial stress and weighed on 
confidence. Strong policy actions by EU and national policy makers have recently led to 
improvements, but the sovereign spreads in vulnerable countries remain high and volatile. At 
the same time, some other EU countries have enjoyed large inflows of private capital and 
witnessed record-low, including negative, interest rates on their sovereign bonds. The tight 
interlinkages between sovereign markets and the EU banking sector continue to pose major 
risks to financial stability in the EU and the euro area in particular. 
Liquidity and structural funding problems have persisted in the EU banking sector. 
Particularly in the vulnerable Member States, access to market funding for a number of banks 
has remained hampered. Downgrades of sovereign ratings have reduced collateral available 
for banks' operations with the Eurosystem and triggered downgrades of banks' own credit 
rating, leading to an increase in banks’ funding costs. In the first half of 2012, funding 
pressures in the vulnerable euro-area Member States have been compounded by deposit 
outflows, while higher-rated Member States have witnessed deposit inflows. Also, banks’ 
internal funding has come under pressure due to reduced growth prospects and thus lesser 
earnings potential. The response of banks to funding pressure was to turn from unsecured to 
secured lending and to the issuing of covered bonds. This has resulted in a significant increase 
in the amount of encumbered assets in banks’ balance sheets, which represents an additional 
source of concern. 
The scarcity of market-based funding and 
rising credit risks due to stagnant growth 
hamper the capacity of banks to lend to 
the real economy. Financing constraints are 
particularly high for small and medium-sized 
enterprises, which are the backbone of the 
EU economy and provide the bulk of 
employment. The lending difficulties are 
greatest in the vulnerable countries where 
distressed banks have been reducing lending, 
although weak growth prospects and the 
need to reduce corporate and household debt 
also reduce the demand for credit (Graph 3). 
At the same time, while banks have 
continued the necessary adjustments of their 
balance sheets, there have been no signs of a 
disorderly or excessive deleveraging. The 
capital flows from public sources, which have mitigated the outflow of private capital, as well 
as the coordinated recapitalisation exercise led by the European Banking Authority have 
played a key role in this regard. Still, the need of deleveraging has varied across countries, 
with banks in vulnerable Member States adjusting their balance sheets faster than elsewhere. 
In view of these factors, it is a positive sign that in the euro area as a whole bank lending to 
the private sector has stabilised in 2012 and the latest ECB Lending Survey has shown some 
easing in funding concerns. 
Graph 3. Bank lending to households and 
non-financial corporations – euro area 
Source: Commission Services  
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The re-emergence of sovereign risks has reversed the process of financial integration in 
the euro area. The introduction of the euro, but also the global pricing of credit risk before 
the crisis, have spurred financial market integration in the euro area and facilitated credit 
flows between euro-area countries. With the bursting of the asset bubbles in some countries 
and the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis, cross-border flows diminished dramatically and 
capital retrenched behind national borders. In particular, private capital flowing over the 
previous decade from the Northern to the Southern euro-area Member States has been falling 
dramatically, as banks have been reduced their cross-border exposure vis-à-vis both 
governments and the private sector in vulnerable countries. The external financing gap that 
emerged as a result was bridged through liquidity drawn from the Eurosystem and in the later 
stages through EU/IMF loans under financial assistance programmes. Also, the home bias in 
sovereign debt holdings increased, strengthening the negative feedback loop between weak 
sovereigns and weak banks. 
Financing conditions across the euro-area countries have diverged. Higher risk premia in 
cross-border lending have led to growing financial fragmentation and thereby to widening 
gaps in interest rates on loans to enterprises and households across euro-area countries. The 
private sector now faces significantly higher interest rates in vulnerable countries than in other 
Member States, in particular in those, which have been perceived as "safe haven" markets 
(Graphs 4 and 5). 
Graph 4. Interest rates on loans to 
enterprises 
Graph 5. Loans to enterprises 
 
Note: New businesses, maturity up to 1 year 
Source: Commission Services 
Note: Index of national stocks y-o-y growth rate 
Source: Commission Services 
The dysfunctionality of credit markets across the euro area poses significant challenges 
for the functioning of monetary union. The ongoing adjustment and restructuring in the 
vulnerable euro-area Member States weighs heavily on growth. Their adjustment process 
depends on the restoration of normal lending conditions by the banking system, which 
presently does not play its proper intermediation role in the single market. Micro- and macro-
prudential supervision with a cross-border dimension, should contribute to the integrated 
banking system to restore its function as financial intermediary.  
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Restoring the conditions for a normal lending to the economy requires addressing the 
underlying root of banks’ distress. Bold policy responses have been adopted at the EU level 
to break the vicious cycle between weak banks and their sovereigns, address the funding 
difficulties, financial fragmentation and broken monetary transmission mechanisms in the 
euro area. 
As part of a road towards genuine EMU, the EU Heads of State agreed in June 2012 to 
move towards a Banking Union, with the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) as a first 
tangible step. Following the agreement, the Commission presented proposals to establish the 
SSM and grant the European Central Bank supervisory powers. At the same time, the 
European Banking Authority would be aligned to the new framework for banking supervision 
in order to ensure consistency at EU level. The SSM aims at removing the differences in 
supervisory practices, which contributed to the trend towards fragmentation of the European 
financial market and put the banking sector at risk. The SSM will ensure that all participating 
Member States have full confidence in the quality and impartiality of banking supervision. 
This is important to guarantee that capital flows will support rebalancing in the short term and 
will not lead to new imbalances in the future (See also Section 3). 
With the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the euro area has 
been equipped with a strong permanent firewall. The large funding capacity (EUR 500 bn) 
and a set of flexible instruments make the ESM well equipped for breaking the negative 
feedback loop between banks and sovereigns and helping to restore confidence. In addition to 
disbursing loans and credit lines for liquidity-constrained euro-area Member States, the ESM 
has an extensive set of instruments and can, if certain pre-conditions are met, intervene on 
primary and secondary bond markets, under conditionality that do not necessarily imply the 
request for a fully-fledged macroeconomic adjustment programme. 
The possibility of using the ESM to recapitalise banks directly will be a powerful tool for 
ultimately breaking the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns in the euro area. 
The ESM can also provide loans specifically targeted at bank recapitalisation. Until now, 
however, these loans could be granted to Member States only, which would in turn use them 
for recapitalisations of their distressed banks. Although bringing some relief to liquidity-
constrained governments, this approach has been a second-best solution to the problem of 
interconnection between banks and sovereigns. In particular, such loans would be recorded in 
Member States’ fiscal accounts and increase their public debt. To overcome this problem, the 
Euro Area Summit decided in June 2012 to allow the ESM to recapitalise banks directly, once 
the SSM has been effectively established. This will go a long way towards de-linking the risks 
of banks and sovereigns in the euro area and will be a major step towards successful 
resolution of the euro area-crisis. 
The European Central Bank has taken effective measures to alleviate banks’ funding 
constraints and repair the monetary transmission mechanism. The two 3-year Long-Term 
Refinancing Operations carried out by the ECB in December 2011 and February 2012 filled 
acute refinancing gaps for euro-area banks by guaranteeing banks’ access to low cost 
medium-term funding. However, as funding pressure persisted and in some euro area Member 
States signs of severe disruptions in the monetary transmission mechanism became apparent, 
the ECB has introduced a new tool - Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) - to safeguard 
the proper transmission of monetary policy in the euro area. OMTs are outright transactions in 
secondary sovereign bond markets subject to strict and effective conditionality in connection 
with an ESM-financed adjustment programme. While the tool has not yet been used, its 
announcement has already led to improvements in the euro-area sovereign bond markets and, 
together with the plans to implement the Banking Union, it has great potential to mitigate 
financial tensions in the euro area and restore conditions for healthy lending to the economy.  
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While strong policy actions have eased market tensions, markets remain very dependent 
on the continuation of supportive policies and the implementation of commitments. 
Underlying vulnerabilities are still present in the EU and particularly the euro-area financial 
system. At the same time, the duration of the crisis in the euro area has led to high 
dependence of market developments on policy measures. Therefore, certainty on policy 
actions and forceful implementation of the agreed measures and national reform policies is 
crucial to containing market volatility. The commitment to build genuine EMU, and a full 
Banking Union in particular, will restore financial stability on a permanent basis. 
3.  STRUCTURAL REFORMS TO SUPPORT GROWTH AND CORRECT IMBALANCES 
Improving confidence and reviving growth in the short run while creating conditions for 
sustainable growth in the future is the main challenge at the current juncture. In a 
context of constrained macroeconomic policies, structural reforms are a crucial element of the 
growth and rebalancing strategy, aimed at tapping the potential of EU economies. Significant 
reform efforts have been made in the vulnerable countries as the crisis progressed. Although 
the need for action in these Member States is more pressing, growth in both the short and 
medium-to-long term is an EU-wide problem which requires a collective response. Despite 
significant differences in the economic situation across Member States, a co-ordinated 
approach to reforms across the Member States and at the EU level would trigger political 
momentum, relax political economy constraints and so facilitate the reform process. 
Graph 6. Current-account balances – euro 
area and Member States 
Graph 7. Unit labour costs and nominal 
compensation per employee – euro-area 
 
Source: Commission Services  Source: Commission Services 
Growth in the EU economy is currently constrained by persisting macroeconomic 
imbalances and the need to adjust past excesses in borrowing and consumption. 
Temporarily lower growth is an inherent feature of deep adjustment, as economies undergo 
restructuring, resources are transferred from non-tradable to tradable sectors and balance 
sheets in all sectors of the economy have to adjust. The required adjustment has continued 
over the last year, in spite of the difficult economic context, and is bearing fruit. Headline 
figures for current account balances, trade data and domestic demand show that adjustment is 
on-going in the EU, including among the euro-area countries, but further progress is needed 
(Graph  6). Adjustment is also currently underway in programme and other vulnerable 
countries, including those where progress appeared limited until recently. Not only are  
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current-account imbalances narrowing, but also unit labour cost developments are supportive 
of more rebalancing in the future (Graph 7). In some deficit countries, nominal wages are 
adjusting in both the public and private sectors. 
The ongoing adjustment in external 
positions appears to be largely structural. 
Deficit countries have experienced a large 
compression in imports and some expansion 
in exports. While the import compression 
has been dominant so far, the gains in 
competitiveness prepare the ground for 
future export expansion and – according to 
the Commission Autumn Economic Forecast 
– export contribution to rebalancing is 
expected to rise over the forecast horizon. 
Provided that the competitiveness gains are 
sustained, the increase in exports should lead 
to development of the export-oriented 
industries and to the permanent nature of the 
adjustment. Nonetheless, the external 
rebalancing in current account flows is not 
yet sufficient to change unsustainable trends 
in stocks (net international investment 
position and external debt) (Graph 8). In 
most deficit countries, the external debt-to-GDP ratios keep on increasing; if they are 
declining, this is mainly due to large revaluation of liabilities. Sizeable adjustment will be 
needed, the cost of which – particularly in employment terms – will depend on the Member 
State’s adjustment capacity. The progress in reducing bilateral current-account imbalances 
between surplus and deficit countries has been much more visible. For the surplus countries, 
there are also signs of rebalancing towards domestic demand, though the adjustment of 
current-account surpluses also reflects that the current account of the whole euro area has 
moved into surplus. 
While the full effect of structural reforms on growth and rebalancing is likely to 
materialise in the medium-to-long run, gains can also emerge in the short term. Reform 
processes are usually associated with adjustment and transition costs in the short term, partly 
because of their generally uneven distribution across firms and individuals. However, 
structural reforms might also have immediate expansionary effects, insofar as they improve 
confidence and expectations across economic actors. Priority should be given to reforms 
entailing the lowest impact on budgetary costs (such as competitiveness and competition-
enhancing reforms in product markets or reduction in regulatory and administrative burden 
for enterprises), while emphasis should also be placed on achieving the best framework 
conditions (e.g. enhanced social dialogue) to support action in policy areas which are 
traditionally more difficult to reform, such as the labour market. Furthermore, synergies 
across different reform areas need to be considered. For instance, labour market reforms 
aimed at moderating unit labour costs might be more effective in driving competitiveness if 
coupled with product-market reforms aimed at increasing competition and squeezing margins. 
In general, interactions among different reform areas and the appropriate timing should be 
studied carefully, taking into account specific conditions in each Member State. 
Graph 8. Current-account and net 
international investment position (NIIP) 
surplus and deficit countries 
Source: Commission Services  
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Financial regulation and supervision have an important role to play in ensuring orderly 
rebalancing and preventing damaging boom-and-busts cycles. The necessary deleveraging 
process taking place in the private sector in some EU countries, also linked with the tight 
financial conditions described in Section 2, might negatively affect growth in the short run. 
However, it is a pre-condition for the correction of excessive internal and external imbalances. 
In parallel, excessive credit growth and leverage in the financial sector, as witnessed before 
the crisis, leads to a build-up of vulnerabilities in the sector that bear a high risk of a 
disorderly correction, with massive negative consequences for economic growth. In this 
context, the development of effective macro and micro prudential tools is crucial to guarantee 
that, once financing conditions across the EU normalise, rebalancing will continue on the 
basis of sustainable capital flows towards the most productive activities and long-term 
investment needs of the EU economy, and that that excessive imbalances will not build up 
again. 
Productivity-enhancing structural reforms remain a priority to foster medium-term 
growth prospects and ensure a lasting rebalancing of the EU economy. Empirical 
evidence shows that reforms aimed at increasing efficiency in product, service and labour 
markets can spur productivity, innovation and increase output and employment levels. 
Structural reforms oriented specifically at supporting innovation, investment in, and the use 
of, ICT and further increasing trade liberalisation also can have a direct impact on 
productivity. Such reforms also favour the reallocation of labour and capital, allowing for 
shifts towards sectors with high growth potential (including green growth sectors and digital 
economy). Moreover, this type of structural reform can play a key role in reducing internal 
and external imbalances, e.g. through improving competitiveness and export performance. 
Structural reforms are particularly relevant in the euro area, where relative prices cannot be 
influenced by nominal exchange-rate movements. 
Fostering the opportunities for green growth could translate into better performance at 
both macro-economic and micro-economic levels. A shift to low-carbon and resource-
efficient production patterns will alleviate the pressure of commodity price shocks on cost 
levels and inflationary expectations. It will reduce resource and energy dependence and thus 
also the energy trade deficit and enhance the competitiveness of the EU economy over the 
long term. The EU has developed policies to improve efficiency in the use of resources, 
including ambitious targets which will have implications for all Member States. The full 
rewards of these policies will be reaped only if they are accompanied by a stable and 
predictable regulatory framework to steer investment, tax shifts away from labour towards 
environmental and consumption taxes, a phasing-out of environmentally-harmful subsidies, 
measures to promote the emergence of new green markets and technologies, and the greening 
of existing production and consumption patterns. 
The momentum of product and service market liberalisation should be maintained. 
Further action is needed to remove unjustified restrictions and improve competition in product 
and service markets, including in the areas of retail trade, regulated professions, construction, 
tourism and business services as well as network industries. This also requires action at EU 
level, where a well-functioning Single Market can both improve growth potential and 
contribute to the unwinding of imbalances. In order to realise its full potential, the 
development of the Single Market requires ambitious improvements, both by strengthening 
enforcement and by increasing reform efforts at country level, as laid down in Single Market 
Acts I and II. In this context, Member States are called upon in particular, to take ambitious  
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measures to implement the Services Directive, given its growth and adjustment capacity 
potential.
6 
Graph 9. Government Effectiveness Index, EU Member States, 2011 
 
Note: The World Bank’s Government Effectiveness Index shows the population’s perception of the quality of 
public and civil services and their degree of independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. The index 
attains values in the range -2.5 to 2.5. 
Source: World Bank 
Improving the business environment, inter alia by seeking ways to increase public sector 
efficiency, is a key priority. An open and effective business environment is a catalyst for 
growth, as it promotes business activity and reduces unnecessary costs for enterprises. 
Evidence shows that administrative complexity or ‘red tape’ has a significant negative impact 
on the level of entrepreneurship, innovation and competitiveness, and the inward FDI flows 
which could play a significant role in addressing imbalances. Moreover, an excessive 
regulatory burden tends to stimulate the shadow economy. An efficient public administration 
should deliver services to the whole economy without imposing disproportionate bureaucratic 
burdens on economic operators (Graph 9). Addressing problems in the public administration 
would contribute both to fiscal consolidation and to competitiveness and growth prospects. In 
particular, reforms of the judicial system would reduce the risks and uncertainty of starting 
and doing business, leading to investment and contributing to reduce transaction costs and 
strengthen competition. To this end, several Member States have already adopted measures to 
shape a more streamlined and effective public service. Key reform areas include judicial 
systems and enhanced use of e-government and e-procurement. 
                                                 
6  Commission services estimate that gains associated with the current implementation of the Services 
Directive in Member States are of the order of 0.8% of EU GDP, while a slightly more ambitious 
implementation, with each country achieving EU-average level of barriers to the cross-border provision 
and establishment of service activities, would bring additional gains worth 0.4 percentage points of 
GDP. Under an extremely ambitious scenario, where each Member State would reach the average of the 
five best-performing countries, an additional 1.8% growth of GDP could be achieved at EU level.  
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Unemployment has become a very serious issue in a number of EU countries,  with 
increasing economic, social and political implications (Graph 10). Rising unemployment is 
accompanied by a major increase in the degree of divergence across EU labour markets. 
While unemployment has increased in most countries, reaching record-high levels in some 
cases, in some Member States it has been falling. Longer periods out of work and worse 
matching between labour demand and supply in many EU countries, also due to sectoral shifts 
in some countries, imply that unemployment may become increasingly structural with a 
negative effect on long-term growth potential. 
Structural reforms play a key role in 
tackling unemployment while improving 
growth and promoting adjustment. If 
unemployment rates are to be reduced 
significantly, the conditions must be created 
for renewed confidence and stable labour 
demand. At the same time, reducing 
joblessness will be key to strengthening 
confidence and ensuring the social and 
political sustainability of current reforms. 
Nonetheless, the immediate challenge is to 
manage high and persistent jobless rates 
under subdued growth conditions and, in 
some countries, against the background of 
ongoing deleveraging and external 
rebalancing. In the light of the different 
labour market conditions across the EU, the 
policy response needs to be coordinated but 
adapted to the specific circumstances of each 
country. 
Graph 10. Employment growth and 
unemployment rate – EU 
Source: Commission Services  
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Since the start of the crisis, several EU countries have taken an active approach to 
labour reform. In some cases, ambitious reform plans have been adopted, with the aim of 
creating more favourable conditions for employment (Graph 11). Recent reform activity 
appears to be largely in line with the priorities set at European level, notably with measures 
that help to make labour markets more dynamic, reducing precariousness and improving 
competitiveness. Some countries with high unemployment and large external imbalances have 
taken up the challenge of improving the responsiveness of wages and their labour market 
adjustment capacity, notably by reforming employment protection legislation (EPL) and the 
wage-setting system. Income protection, activation and job search assistance policies have 
been adapted to the growing labour market challenges. However, not all countries have so far 
taken the necessary steps to rise to the policy challenges they are facing. 
Graph 11. Number of labour market measures by domain, total EU 
 
Note: ALMPs exclude training. 
Source: Commission services, DG ECFIN LABREF database. 
Tackling unemployment and support for job creation should be high on the policy 
agenda.  The momentum in labour market reform should be maintained, particularly in 
countries characterised by major labour market challenges.  The extent to which potential 
growth can sustainably resume to a large extent depends on how successfully labour market 
bottlenecks are addressed and the risk of unemployment hysteresis is tackled. Appropriate 
policy responses are urgently needed in order to address structural and institutional labour 
market challenges (labour market segmentation, deterioration in the job matching process and 
persistent structural unemployment). Efforts aimed at ambitious structural reform favouring 
adjustment (EPL, wage setting) and the proper implementation of enacted measures need to 
be maintained in countries with major labour-market challenges. Specific measures can also 
be considered to boost labour demand by reducing taxation on labour – notably on low-paid 
groups – when fiscal conditions allow, and supporting entrepreneurship and the social 
economy. In addition, there is a need for targeted measures to promote the hiring of specific 
groups of workers at risk of dropping out from the labour force (such as the long-term 
unemployed or young workers with no previous experience), including by means of cost-
effective active labour market policies and by exploiting the potential of job-rich sectors.  
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of change
Annual 
rate of 
change
Annual rate 
of change
Annual rate 
of change
Annual 
rate of 
change
% of GDP   % change  % of GDP %  of GDP
Total 
taxes as % 
of GDP
High level 
means weak 
sustain-
ability
At 60 years % of GDP %
Percentage 
points
%
2011 2012 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011
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BE 118 -0.2 61.9 3.5 18.7 66.7 2.7 2.6 -0.9 3.5 2.9 1.0 5.0 97.8 -3.7 45.6 7.4 61.6 23.6 238.4 4.2 1.1 1.4
BG 45 0.8 58.5 6.3 25.0 66.0 1.1 -1.0 : 4.8 8.1 1.7 5.6 16.3 -2.0 27.1 2.8 64.1 19.4 : 19.7 2.3 4.6
CZ 80 -1.3 65.7 2.7 18.1 70.5 1.1 0.4 -1.3 1.4 2.6 -3.9 5.9 40.8 -3.3 34.4 5.5 60.5 21.4 78.1 7.1 0.9 13.7
DK 125 0.6 73.1 1.8 14.2 79.3 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.9 2.2 6.6 5.4 46.6 -1.8 49.0 3.3 62.3 22.8 241.5 3.0 -0.2 0.6
DE 120 0.8 72.5 2.8 8.6 77.2 1.4 2.3 -2.2 3.0 3.1 5.6 5.2 80.5 -0.8 39.8 1.4 62.4 23.8 128.3 1.6 0.0 2.2
EE 67 2.5 65.1 7.1 22.3 74.7 -1.4 1.6 -10.1 3.5 -2.0 0.3 7.4 6.1 1.1 33.0 1.2 62.6 21.5 141.0 4.5 : 25.5
IE 127 0.4 59.2 8.6 29.4 69.4 -3.2 : : 0.1 : 1.1 4.6 106.4 -13.4 29.9 4.1 64.1 23.5 332.0 : 3.8 -11.1
EL 82 -6.0 55.6 8.8 44.4 67.7 -1.8 -2.3 -0.2 -1.7 -5.5 -11.7 4.9 170.6 -9.4 34.8 -2.4 61.5 23.8 124.6 12.1 19.4 43.5
ES 99 -1.4 57.7 9.0 46.4 73.7 -1.5 -0.1 -4.1 -1.1 1.4 -3.7 4.2 69.3 -9.4 32.9 4.8 62.3 25.1 214.2 5.2 4.4 0.1
FR 107 0.2 63.9 4.0 22.9 70.4 1.6 1.6 2.3 2.5 3.2 -2.6 4.9 86.0 -5.2 45.6 1.6 60.2 25.4 141.1 4.6 0.8 5.6
IT 101 -2.3 56.9 4.4 29.1 62.2 0.9 1.4 2.1 -0.1 2.4 -3.3 5.4 120.7 -3.9 42.4 -2.3 60.4 24.6 126.0 9.5 3.8 -13.0
CY 92 -2.3 68.1 1.6 22.4 74.0 3.3 1.9 0.7 3.2 2.7 -4.2 7.4 71.1 -6.3 34.7 8.2 62.8 23.6 : 5.5 -86.0
LV 58 4.3 61.8 8.8 31,0 73.3 3,0 3.4 3.5 5.1 : -2.4 10.4 42.2 -3.4 27.7 -0.7 62.7 20.0 123.1 10.1 2.4 5.1
LT 62 2.9 60.7 8.0 32.9 72.0 -0.1 0.2 -2.9 2.6 4.7 -3.7 9.8 38.5 -5.5 26.4 4.7 59.9 20.3 69.4 16,0 3.0 17.0
LU 274 0.4 64.6 1.4 16.4 67.9 3.3 3.1 2.0 1.9 2,0 7.1 10.1 18.3 -0.3 38.1 9.7 59.4 23.8 : : 0.2 6.2
HU 66 -1.2 55.8 5.2 26.1 62.7 1.8 2.5 5.7 1.6 3.3 1.0 6.1 81.4 4.3 36.6 0.5 59.7 20.0 154.9 14.9 5.8 -7.9
MT 83 1.0 57.6 3.0 13.8 61.6 1.3 : : 2.3 0.7 -0.3 4.4 70.9 -2.7 34.8 5.8 60.5 24.1 212.3 1.5 2.5 4.2
NL 131 -0.3 74.9 1.5 7.6 78.4 1.2 2.0 -1.8 0.9 1.8 8.3 5.2 65.5 -4.5 38.8 5.9 63.5 23.9 : 2.4 0.4 6.2
AT 129 0.8 72.1 1.1 8.3 75.3 0.9 2.9 -3.9 1.9 2.5 1.1 5.9 72.4 -2.5 43.7 4.1 60.9 24.1 161.9 4.1 0.6 1.5
PL 65 2.4 59.7 3.6 25.8 66.1 0.7 4.3 -7.9 4.8 4.2 -4.5 6.2 56.4 -5.0 32.5 1.6 59.3 21.5 79.0 6.0 3.4 12.3
PT 77 3.0 64.2 6.2 30.1 74.1 -0.7 : : : : -6.6 3.9 108.1 -4.4 36.1 -1.8 62.6 24.2 247.9 5.3 7.1 -4.1
RO 49 0.8 58.5 3.1 23.7 63.3 1.7 : : -8.5 7.2 -4.1 5.4 33.4 -5.0 27.5 3.7 64.3 19.7 : 11.4 5.1 1.3
SI 84 -2.3 64.4 3.6 15.7 70.3 -0.6 -0.3 -1.0 -0.1 1.5 0.1 5.5 46.9 -6.4 37.6 7.6 59.8 23.3 130.3 : 4.8 -11.1
SK 73 2.6 59.5 9.2 33.5 68.9 -0.4 2.7 0.0 -0.6 2.8 -2.5 6.2 43.3 -4.9 28.8 6.9 58.8 20.4 74.8 4.0 2.7 11.1
FI 116 0.1 69.0 1.7 20.1 74.9 1.8 2.6 1.9 2.8 3.8 -1.1 7.7 49.0 -0.6 43.4 5.8 61.7 23.9 179.9 0.8 0.3 8.1
SE 126 1.1 74.1 1.4 22.9 80.2 -0.8 -1.0 -4.1 0.6 1.3 6.5 5,0 38.4 0.4 44.9 2.0 64.4 24.2 234.7 : 0.0 10.7
UK 108 -0.3 69.5 2.7 21.1 75.7 1.5 : : : : -1.9 5.2 85.0 -7.8 37.6 5.2 63.0 23.8 : 2.2 0.0 4.2
EA  108 -0.4 64.3 4.6 20.8 71.5 0.9 : : : : 0.3 5.1 88.1 -4.1 40.6 2.7 61.5 24.0 : : 2.3 :
EU 100 -0.3 64.3 4.1 21.4 71.2 0.9 : : : : 0.0 5.2 83.0 -4.4 39.9 2.1 61.5 23.2 : : 2.0 :
* Variables mentioned in the text on the Euro Plus Pact in the European Council conclusions of March 2011
Sources: Commission services, Eurostat, ECB
Youth 
unemp-
loyment 
(<25)* 
2010 or 
latest 
available
Average 
exit age 
from the 
labour 
force* 
 General 
Government 
Debt* 
General 
Government 
budget 
position* 
Nominal Unit Labour Costs* 
Nominal 
Compensation per 
employee* 
GDP per 
capita in 
PPS
GDP 
growth 
projec-
tion
Employ-
ment rate
Competitiveness Growth and jobs
Life 
expectancy* 
Public Finances
Labour-
force 
partici-
pation 
rate* 
Current 
Account 
Balance* 
Market 
share of 
exports 
(goods + 
services)*  
Overall 
tax 
burden
Sustainabi
lity 
Indicator 
(S2)* 
Long-term 
unemplo-
yment* 
Financial Stability
Non 
performing 
loans
Long-term 
interest 
rate 
spreads vis-
à-vis 
Germany
Return on 
equity
Private debt*
 